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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH
I~ICHARD

P. Sl\iOOT and
BARBARA l\L S~rOOT,
Plaintiffs and Appella;nts,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9515

HOWARD L. LUND and
GWEN C. LUND,
Defenda.n.ts and Respondents.

APP·ELLANTS' BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The plaintiffs-appellants brought this suit consisting
of four causes of action. \\' e are concerned on this appeal
\vith a summary judgment granted as to the plaintiffsappellants' Second Cause of Action. This cause of action
''Tas based upon an agreement solicited by the defendantrespondent, Howard L. Lund, \vhile acting as the attorney
for the plaintiff-appellant Richard P. Smoot under the
terms of which appellant Smoot was to lend money to
Lund to help him buy and develop a real estate project.
1
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Appellant Smoot sued to reform the contract alleging the contract as drafted does not incorporate the total
agreement between the parties because respondent Lund
fraudulently drafted it so that it would not express the
agreement as made between the parties. Appellant Smoot
also prayed for sums due him under the agreement for
general damages and for exemph1.ry damages for fraud.
Lund tendered $15,347.50 into court and moved for Summary Judgment on this cause of action which motion 'vas
granted. The appellants Smoot contend that:
1. The tender of $15,347.50 did not entitle the defendants to a summary judgment.

2. The appellant is entitled to a reformation of the
contract and that this is an issue ,,-hich cannot be resolved
on a motion for Summary J ndgment.
3. The issue of 'vhether or not Smoot is entitled to
damages and costs cannot be disposed of on a motion for
Summary Judgment.

ST.A_TE~IF~~T

OF F..:\CTS

The facts alleged in the plaintiffs' ...._.\mended Complaint must be considered as established for purposes of
this appeal since summary judgment "Tas granted the
defendants on the allegations contained in the Second
Cause of Action of the .;\mended Complaint.
Some time prior to February 9, 1959, the defendants
solicited financial support from the plaintiffs to finance
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YPittur<~

a real estate
g'Hg'P< l

""hich the defendants "\Vere en-

in.

1\ t all times pPrtinent to this transaction the defend-

ant, Ho,vard I.J. Lund, \\"as the attorney for the plaintiffappellant Riehard P. Smoot. Smoot loaned $36,000.00
to finance tlH real estate venture. Smoot agreed to
accept one of the lots as an $8,500.00 payment on the loan
and H<n\·ard Lund agreed to secure the balance of
$27,500.00 'vith a lien on certain real property owned by
the defendants and located at 2337 East 13th South, Salt
Ijake City, Utah, and by a trust deed to a lot in Santa
Clara County, California.
1

Lund further agreed that the remaining real estate
would be developed and sold and that in the event the
sales price for this property was in excess of $12,500.00
the excess would be divided between Smoot and Lund.
Thereafter on February 9, 1959, Lund prepared
a document designated as Exhibit '' B '' in the Complaint
( R-7) and executed a deed of trust to the California property, a copy of which was designated as Exhibit '' C '' in
the Complaint. (R-9, 10)
The defendant Howard L. Lund represented to his
client Smoot that the document Exhibit '' B '' was legally
sufficient to give effect to all the terms of their understanding and \\"as sufficient to secure the obligation of
$27,500.00 and the interest he was to receive in the real
estate development.
3
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The defendant Lund drafted the document (R-7) in
such a way that it neither protected the plaintiffs with a
recordable lien on the real estate nor did it spell out the
agreement that plaintiffs were to share the profits from
the sale of the remaining real estate if sold for more than
$12,500.00.
The appellant further alleges that Lund drew the
Promissory Note intentionally excluding therefrom the
usual provisions allowing the costs of collection and attorney fees to the holders of the note in the event suit had
to be brought to collect said note in order to protect himself at the expense of his client and that the appellant is
thereby damaged to the extent of his costs of court and
attorneys' fees.
The appellant further alleges that the defendant,
Ho,Yard L. Lund, executed in plaintiffs' favor a trust
deed to a lot in Santa Clara County, California, to secure
the $27,500.00 note and advised the plaintiff not to record
it and by reason of the trust and confidence that Smoot
had in Lund the Smoots did not do so. Thereafter the
defendant, Howard L. Lund, conYeyed the California
property to a third party in Yiolation of the trust deed
given to the Smoots to secure their loan.
Upon learning of this the Smoots filed suit asking the
following relief:
1. That the court reform the contract to conform to
the actual agreement bet,Yccn the parties and enforce
plaintiffs' rights therein.
4
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For a judgment for the balance due under the
promissory note dPsignated as Exhibit '' B '' in the
Complaint.
3. That the plaintiffs obtain their attorney fees and
costs of collection by reason of the act of Lund in preparing the note \vithout the usual cost of collection and
attorney fee elause being included therein.

4. That Lund be ordered to obtain a re-conveyance
of the property in California which was deeded to the
Smoots as security for the loan and conveyed away in
fraud on the Smoots.
5. For exemplary damages.
6. For costs of court.

The defendants, almost three months after the action
was filed, tendered the sum of $15,347.50 into court after
denying any sum at all was due (R-38) and moved for
Summary Judgment on the Second Cause of Action which
was granted.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I
THE TENDER INTO COURT OF ANY SUM BY
THE DEFENDANTS COULD NOT JUSTIFY THE
TRIAL COURT IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS.
PoiNT

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE PLAINTIFFS
PoiNT
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WERE NOT ENTITLED TO THE OTHER RELIEF REQUESTED IN PLAINTIFFS' SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION.
(A) THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED
TO REFORMATION IF THEY CAN PROVE
THE FACTS ALLEGED.
(B) IF THE PLAINTIFFS PROVE THEIR
ALLEGATIONS THAT THE DEFENDANT
HOWARD L. LUND INTENTIONALLY EXCLUDED FROM THE PROMISSORY NOTE
PROVISIONS NORMALLY INCLUDED BY
LAWYERS TO ALLOW THEIR CLIENTS TO
RECOVER COSTS OF COLLECTION AND
ATTORNEY FEES, THE DEFENDANT
WOULD BE LIABLE FOR SUCH COSTS AND
FEES.
(C) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS COULD
NOT RECOVER EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
ARGU~IEXT

l?oiXT I

THE TENDER INTO COURT OF ANY SUM BY
THE DEFENDANTS COULD NOT JUSTIFY THE
TRIAL COURT IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS.
There is no rule of procedure in this state that permits the defendant in an action to tender into court the
sum he thinks due and then obtain a judgment against
the plain tiff.
The rules do provide for an offer of judgment 'vhich
if accepted results in a judgment against the defendant
6
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and if not accepted deprives the plaintiff of interest and
eo~ts in the event he recovers no more than the amount
of the offer of judgement.

"RULE 68
OFFER OF JUDGMENT
(a) TENDER OF MoNEY BEFORE SurT. When in
an action for the recovery of money only, the defendant alleges in his answer that before the commencement of the action he tendered to the
plaintiff the full amount to which the plaintiff was
entitled, and thereupon deposits in court for the
plaintiff the amount so tendered, and the allegation is found to be true, the plaintiff cannot recover costs, but must pay costs to the defendant.
(b) OFFER BEFORE TRIAL. At any time more
than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken
against him for the money or property or to the
effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If \vithin 10 days after the service of the
offer the adverse party serves written notice that
the offer is accepted, either party may then file
the offer and notice of acceptance together \vith
proof of service thereof and thereupon judgment
shall be entered. An offer not accepted shall be
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs.
If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is
not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must
pay the costs incurred after the making of the
offer. The fact that an offer is made but not
accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer."
There is nothing in the record to show that the tender made \vas more than an offer of settlement which the
7
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trial court required the plaintiffs to accept by ordering
that the tender be received and the cause of action be
dismissed. The defendants did not comply with the rule
cited above and had they done so they would not be entitled to a. summary judgment but could thereby avoid
interest and costs if the offer of judgment was refused
and the plaintiffs failed to recover more than the offer of
judgment.
PoiNT

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE PLAINTIFFS
WERE NOT ENTITLED TO THE OTHER RELIEF REQUESTED IN PLAINTIFFS' SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION.
(A) THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED
TO REFORMATION IF THEY CAN PROVE
THE FACTS ALLEGED.

The defendant, Howard L. Lund, was the attorney
for the plaintiffs and drew the strange document in issue,
(R-7). The plaintiffs allege that he misrepresented the
legal effect of the document assuring them that the legal
result of the document was that the Smoots would receive as consideration for financing the project one-half
of all profits on the sale of the remaining portion of the
real estate over $12,500.00.
A misrepresentation of la"~ by an attorney to his
client or eYcn to a lay person not his client is a fraud.
ResfafeJne11f of Torts, Sec. 621 Comment (d). Goodrich
v. ~-.'iears, 270 Fed. 971; F)tatcn Island Ice Co. r. [T. S. 85
Fed. (~d) 68; Engelbrecht v. Engelbrecht, 323 Ill. 208, 153
8
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~.E.

827 ~

~~~nterson

( o. v . . Anderson, 58 ~[ont. 617, 194
Pa(l. 160~ ~l'"hitc v. Heui(·au, 77 Okl. 123, 186 Pac. 224, 9
.\. L. B. 1041 ~ (1\nnotations on this point 96 1\. L. R. 992);
Resfatcntcut of Contracts, Sec. 474, Comment (d); Craunu'r v. Kausa.s (:ity Higluray Co., 112 Kan. 298, 211
Pac. 118.
1

The above authorities hold it a fraud even though no
attorney-client relationship existed. This should be true
a fortiori 'vhere the advice and interpretation is given by
the plaintiffs' own attorney who drafted the contract and
who is personally interested in it.
If the plaintiffs prove that their attorney falsely
represented that the document prepared by him spelled
out in legal verbage the understanding of the parties,
they are entitled to have the agreement reformed by the
court to conform to the true agreement between the
parties.
"Still another remedy is applicable for a particular kind of fraud. This remedy is reformation
of a writing which owing to the fraud of one of
the parties and mistake of the other fails to express the agreement at which they arrived.'' ( W illiston on Contracts No. 1525 Page 4272)
If the contract was to be reformed as prayed,
the plaintiffs \vould be entitled to a share of the profits in
the real estate venture and not just a return of their
money loaned to the Lunds. The right to reformation of
this contract for fraud cannot be disposed of on a motion
for summary judgment, the issue of fraud being an issue
of fact. Indeed, the burden of proof is usually imposed
9
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upon the attorney dealing with his clients to show the
complete fairness of the transaction and that he protected
his client in every way possible. York v. James, 26 Wyo.
184, 165 Pac. (2d) 109.

(B) IF THE PLAINTIFFS PROVE THEIR
ALLEGATIONS THAT THE DEFENDANT
HOWARD L. LUND INTENTIONALLY EXCLUDED FROM THE PROMISSORY NOTE
PROVISIONS NORMALLY INCLUDED BY
LAWYERS TO ALLOW THEIR CLIENTS TO
RECOVER COSTS OF COLLECTION AND
ATTORNEY FEES, THE DEFENDANT
WOULD BE LIABLE FOR SUCH COSTS AND
FEES.
It is hard to believe that any attorney, if employed
to draw a promissory note for $27,500.00, would draw it
so that if the maker did not pay the note "Then due his
client could not recover his costs of collection including
reasonable attorney fees.
The plaintiffs allege that the attorney intentionally
excluded these provisions in order to protect himself in
the event of default. If these allegations are proved, the
client \Yonld surel~T be entitled to damages for his intentionally excluding these provisions.
An attorney occupies a position of trust and confidence with referenc0 to his rlient 's affairs and in dealing- with his client he must exercise the highest degree of
rare; the utmost good faith, honesty, integrity, fairness,
and fidelity. 7 C.J.S. Sec. 125, Page 957.

10
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If the note in issue had been drawn with a third party
as maker instead of the payees' own attorney it is extremely doubtful that such a document would meet the
standard of practice required of attorneys in this state
and, if it did not, the defendant Lund would be guilty of
negligent practice and would be liable to his client. A
fortiori he is liable if he intentionally excludes these provisions in a note where he is the maker and his client is
the payee.
This issue was ruled upon as a matter of law, the
trial court holding in effect by its ruling that an attorney owes no duty in dealing with his client to incorporate
the usual and reasonable provisions in a promissory note
to protect his client. This is certainly an issue of fact
\\·hich cannot be decided against the plaintiffs as a matter
of law.
(C) THE

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS COULD
NOT RECOVER EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants defrauded
them in the following particulars :
1. By advising them that recording the trust deed
\Yas unnecessary and then selling the very property conYeyed to them by the trust deed.
2. By falsely advising the plaintiffs as to the legal
effect of the ''Promissory Note.''
11
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3. By so drafting the agreement that it deprived the
plaintiffs of substantial rights in order for Lund to profit
thereby and have the advantage of his client.
If these allegations are sustained by the evidence
the plaintiffs could be awarded exemplary damages. Exemplary damages may be allowed against an attorney
who, when dealing with his client, violates his duty. The
cases do not even require a showing of actual damage so
strict is the law as it relates to the duty owed by an attorney to his client. 7 C.J.S. No. 157 at Page 1004; Hill v.
Montgomery, 56 N.E. 320; Greenberg v. Billelo, 7 N.Y.S.
(2d) 735; Harmening v. Howland, 141 N.W.131.

CONCLUSION
The court erred in granting Summary Judgment on
plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action. There are substantial
issues of fact to be tried and the offer to pay a sum
deemed by the defendants to be a sufficient sum to settle
the case does not entitle them to Summary Judgmnt.
Respectfully submitted,
McBROOM & HYDE
-l-01 El Paso Natural Gas Building

315 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and ...4ppellants
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